Iraq and views the situation in the country as dire, according to a
series of letters intercepted by Multinational Forces Iraq earlier this
year.
The letters, which have been sent exclusively to The Long War Journal by
Multinational Forces Iraq, are a series of communications between Ayman
al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, Abu Ayyub al Masri, al Qaeda
in Iraq's leader, and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, the leader of al Qaeda's
Islamic State of Iraq. These letters were intercepted by Coalition
forces in Baghdad on April 24, 2008. One of the letters written by
Zawahiri is dated March 6, 2008.
Coalition forces found the letters on the corpse of a senior al Qaeda in
Iraq leader called Abu Nizar, whose real name is Ali Hamid Ardeny al
Essawi. He was killed when he was stopped at a Baghdad checkpoint and
pulled a gun. He later was identified by al Qaeda operatives in custody.
At the time of his death, Nizar served as al Qaeda in Iraq's information
minister. His responsibilities included running al Qaeda in Iraq's
propaganda network as well as the primary link to the regional terror
group and al Qaeda's senior leadership.
These communications with al Qaeda in Iraq leaders matched the US
military's view that the terror group suffered a major setback in Iraq.
"The letters confirmed our assessment that Al Qaeda has suffered
significant damage and serious reverses in Iraq, including widespread
rejection of [al Qaeda in Iraq's] indiscriminate violence, extremist
ideology, and oppressive practices," General David Petraeus, the
Commander of Multinational Forces Iraq told The Long War Journal. "Even
Zawahiri recognized that [al Qaeda in Iraq] has lost credibility in
Iraq."
Letters show al Qaeda in Iraq's leadership is in disarray
The series of letters highlights the divisions within al Qaeda in Iraq
and highlights al Qaeda's senior leadership's questions about the
leadership in Iraq. Al Masri is portrayed as an ineffective leader who
is refusing to respond to questions by al Qaeda's senior leadership
based in Pakistan. Leaders also criticize al Qaeda in Iraq's propaganda
campaign, stating the group has intentionally deceived followers by
releasing old footage and inflating enemy casualties.
A rash and incompetent leader
Much of the criticism of al Masri comes from a senior al Qaeda in Iraq
leader known as Abu Suleiman al Otaibi, a Saudi national who served as a
senior leader in al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq. Otaibi "migrated" to
Afghanistan at the end of 2007, where he then reported to al Qaeda's
leadership on al Masri's leadership flaws. Otaibi was killed by US
forces during a strike in Paktia province in the spring of 2008.
Otaibi's concerns about al Masri are expressed in Zawahiri's letter to
Baghdadi, where al Masri is portrayed as an ineffective, rash leader who
has cut himself off from al Qaeda in Iraq's field commanders. Al Masri,
according to Otaibi, only communicates through a tight circle of "very
leading personalities" in order to avoid being targeted by US forces. He
bristles at criticism of his actions or those of his appointed
commanders and refuses to accept bad news.
Otaibi's harshest criticism of al Masri is leveled at the latter's
decision to send a force of al Qaeda fighters into Ramadi in late June
2007. Al Masri is said to have ordered the al Qaeda fighters to attack
Ramadi "in a moment of anger against the brothers ... despite of the
great danger." At that time, the Awakening and Iraqi and US security
forces consolidated control over much of Anbar province, and al Qaeda's
network was seriously degraded in the region.
The Iraqi police in the Ramadi region received word of al Qaeda in
Iraq's plan, and US forces ambushed the group as it gathered in an
island on the Euphrates River. The engagement, called the Battle of
Donkey Island, resulted in at least 23 al Qaeda fighters killed and
dozens captured. Otaibi said only a handful of al Qaeda fighters escaped
from the battle.
Failure to communicate
In one letter from Zawahiri to al Masri, Zawahiri implores al Masri to
defend himself from criticism from other al Qaeda in Iraq's leadership.
Zawahiri then asks for a status update and chides al Masri for failing
to respond to prior inquiries.
"We also want to repeat to you our request to write to us full detailed
reports about your current conditions," Zawahiri stated. "Also, the
brothers request to know about your experiences ... and I have asked you
about this many times."
Al Qaeda in Iraq's propaganda failures
Otaibi savages al Qaeda in Iraq's propaganda efforts. The group is
guilty of recycling old footage from the archives of al Tawhid wal
Jihad, the predecessor of al Qaeda in Iraq, and rerunning the footage as
new attacks, Otaibi told Zawahiri.
"[The videos] are all old from the archives and were presented as if
they were new operations, and this is fraudulent and concealment of the
truth," Otaibi was paraphrased as saying in one of the letters. He also
states that the group stole video footage from other Sunni insurgent
groups and rebranded the content as their own.
Al Qaeda's handling of its propaganda has been a sore spot among jihadi
and insurgent groups for years, said Nick Grace, who tracks al Qaeda's
propaganda efforts.
"It's openly known on the al Qaeda forums that the Islamic State of Iraq
and al Furqan Media Center churn out archival footage, including
years-old attacks by Zarqawi's group al Tawhid wal Jihad," Grace said.
"They have also been caught posting videos of attacks conducted by other
groups in Iraq with their media logo. Sunni insurgents complained
publicly about al Furqan's methods in September 2007."
Al Qaeda in Iraq's propaganda output has been significantly degraded,
Grace said. Al Furqan released 111 videos in 2007, according to Grace.
Only 34 videos have been release since January 2008.
"On the brink of extinction"
Information from recently captured al Qaeda operatives supports the
letters from senior al Qaeda leaders that portray the jihad in Iraq
being in disarray, according to a Multinational Forces Iraq document
obtained by The Long War Journal.
An operative captured on Aug. 21 said the group has "lost the overall
fight" and suffers from "extreme financial difficulties." Al Qaeda in
Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq do "not presently have any long time
plan and are only focused on short time fighting," the operative told US
forces.
Another operative, also captured on Aug. 21, said "foreign fighters in
Iraq are on the brink of extinction and the group's "biggest concern
right now is where to sleep at night without being arrested."
Recent estimates of foreign al Qaeda fighters entering Iraq backs up
this assertion. From February to June 2007, an estimated 80 to 110
foreign fighters were entering Iraq, according to Multinational Forces
Iraq. From January to August 2008, the estimate is 12 to 15 foreign
fighters entering the country. Senior al Qaeda leaders, including al
Masri, were reported to have fled Iraq to Pakistan's tribal areas
earlier this summer.
Al Qaeda in Iraq is also suffering from serious logistical and
recruiting problems. Communications have been disrupted and al Qaeda
cannot pay its fighters, other captured al Qaeda leaders said. In
Baghdad, al Qaeda lost 75 percent of its strength. In Mosul, al Qaeda
operations are assessed as being in a "state of irreparable
deterioration" and survival is the measure of success.
Throughout Iraq, recruiting is difficult if not impossible. "The main
problem is that al Qaeda in Iraq has lost support of the people in
Iraq," one captured operative said.
Petraeus advises caution
While the news of al Qaeda's setbacks in Iraq is encouraging, General
Petraeus advises caution in moving forward and is hesitant to declare
victory prematurely.
"No one here is doing victory dances in the end zone, as AQI [al Qaeda
in Iraq] remains lethal and dangerous," he told The Long War Journal.
"In fact, though there has been substantial progress, AQI has
demonstrated resilience, adaptability, and a continuing capability to
carry out barbaric attacks, albeit in much smaller numbers. So we and
our Iraqi partners clearly have much work still to do -- and that's what
we're endeavoring to do."
By Bill RoggioSeptember 11, 2008 (The Long War Journal)
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